Beyond Mundane Reason:
Conversation Analysis And Context

Jenny Mandelbaum
Rutgers University

Conversation analysts have sometimes been taken to task for apparently choosing not to deal with the "context" of the conversational activities they examine (Cicourel, 1981). In Talking Culture Moerman (1988) describes a blend of ethnography and conversation analysis, and suggests that ethnography describes contextual data extrinsic to interaction while conversation analysis provides non-contexted structural descriptions of talk.

In the present essay I re-examine the posture of conversation analysis toward context, and show that conversation analysis may supply details of cultural context rarely provided in ethnography. Conversation analysts describe talk-intrinsic details which provide us with accounts of social action that take us beyond "mundane reason" (Pollner, 1987), and extend our sense of what "context" could mean.

Conversation analysts aim to describe methods for social action which are both context-sensitive and context-free. Rather than ignoring context, this stance makes "context" a central and problematic issue for each inquiry. Detailed analysis of interaction suggests that the components of context are not transparent.

In order to explicate conversation analytic notions of context, I compare Moerman's "culturally contexted conversation analysis" [CCCA] to two essays illustrative of conversation analysts' ap-
proaches to context: Pomerantz (1978) and Drew (1987). Pomerantz’ version of context resembles Moerman’s in focusing on participants’ knowledge about how social action works. She differs from Moerman in that she gains access to this knowledge by examining its traces in the details of interaction. Drew’s approach explicates context as entirely local to the ongoing scene. The comparison between these works and Moerman’s CCCA suggests that the work of these conversation analysts is in fact culturally contexted.

In order to explicate various strands of context in the conversation analytic tapestry I first draw on Schegloff’s (1987) discussion of various possible senses of context. I then outline Moerman’s (1988) “culturally contexted conversation analysis” using an example from his book. I supplement his description with further conversation analytic description of the same segment. The discussion of the studies by Drew and by Pomerantz illustrates some contrasts between two views of context: Talk-intrinsic and talk-extrinsic. These exercises show conversation analysis to be fundamentally and pervasively concerned with context.

TWO NOTIONS OF CONTEXT

Context provides fundamental building blocks in both participants’ and researchers’ understanding of everyday social life. However, ethnographers and conversation analysts disagree on how the term “context” is to be used. Moerman proposes that contextual resources are external to talk. Conversation analysts usually takes context to be intrinsic to (and created in) interaction. The contrast between talk-extrinsic and talk-intrinsic notions of context is illustrated by Schegloff (1987). In proposing three different connections between “macro” and “micro” he offers what could be taken to be three ingredients of context.

First Schegloff examines the possibility of culture providing for variations in conversational practice, specifically the practice of conversational repair. Following Moerman’s (1977) work in Thai conversation, and other such findings, Schegloff argues that there is strikingly little
variation in the ways that repair gets initiated in such diverse languages as American English, Thai, Tuvaluan, and Quiché. The observation entails that practices of conversational repair appear to operate largely independent of culture. Thus far, Schegloff and Moerman agree.

Next Schegloff assesses the relevance to conversational activities of such participants’ attributes as sex, ethnicity, and social class. He takes up the issue of speakers’ sex, in particular the “reported asymmetry of interruption between the sexes — men interrupting women far more frequently than the opposite” (1987, p. 214). He raises two questions. First, is the fact that the participants are male or female something that they orient to at this moment in the interaction? That is, do participants show in the ways that they do interrupting that speakers’ sex — rather than age, status, or something altogether different, is causing the interruption? Second, Schegloff asks whether these characterizations are “analytically linked to specific conversational mechanisms by which the outcomes might be produced” (1987, p. 215). That is, can we show how sex is linked to the details of the interruptions themselves as they occur? Schegloff argues that if we prematurely introduce such macro-level variables to account for actions we run the risk of preempting “full technical exploration of the aspects of interaction being accounted for and the micro-level mechanisms that are involved in their production.” That is, if we jump to the conclusion that the important thing in describing these interruptions is that men interrupt women — then we may never achieve a satisfactory technical description of how interrupting gets done. In focusing upon extrinsic variation such as sex, he argues, we run the risk of missing discourse-intrinsic features that might better account for the conversational activities.

Finally Schegloff proposes a talk-intrinsic sense of context in which “modes of interactional organization might themselves be treated as contexts” (1987, p. 221). He suggests that context includes

the form of organized solutions... to such generic problems as managing the allocation and size of turns among the parties, providing for the organized production of stretches of talk into coherent sequences and courses of action... furnishing orderly means for dealing with troubles of speaking, hearing, and understanding the talk so as to allow the action to proceed there and then,
providing orderly procedures for the starting and ending of episodes of concerted interactional activity, and the like (p. 221).

It is conversational features of this kind that Pomerantz and Drew bring to bear in order to provide context-based explanations for why compliments and teases are responded to in the ways that they are. A talk-intrinsic sense of context, on this view, may specify participants’ solutions to multifaceted interactional problems. Before explicating how this is the case, I first review Moerman’s Culturally Contexted Conversation Analysis.

CULTURALLY CONTEXTED CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

In proposing CCCA Moerman appears to be addressing a deficiency that he finds in conversation analysis. He suggests that conversation analysts focus on “the dry bones of the talk,” and thereby bypass the “roles, passions, institutions, and private strategies” of daily life (1988, p. xi). He proposes a synthesis of ethnography, “with its concern for context, meaning, history, and intention” with conversation analysis and its “sometimes arid and always exacting techniques... for locating culture *in situ*” (p. xi).

Moerman proposes that talk-extrinsic data are needed to understand talk and the social work that it accomplishes. The fundamental issue here is what we need to know in order to understand the intricacies of social life. Moerman raises this problem when he suggests that conversation analysis “provides some foothold on the technical specification of context as significant place” but does not take the further (and necessary) step of finding “the meaning and consequence of a conversational event”:

Sequential position produces the nodes from which we hang our chimes of talk. But without the scale and resonance of categorical ascriptions and the situationally occasioned normative cultural knowledge they invoke, the clacking of talk across turns is mere noise (p. 29).
Moerman suggests that such social meanings reside in the history of interactions, in participants’ “relationship and biography” and other data external to the details of talk and interaction. Ethnographers may supply these invisible, inaudible materials, and add living flesh to the skeleton of conversational form.

**CCCA and the “Leper” Overlap**

The contrast between CCCA’s talk-extrinsic sense of context, and conversation analysis’ can be demonstrated by comparing the two approaches to a single fragment of data. In *Talking Culture* Moerman explains an instance of speech overlap by adding ethnographic information to a structural description in order to specify the event’s “meaning.” I summarize his analysis, and then offer some conversation analytic description of details in the talk. This procedure may make possible some comparison of talk-intrinsic and talk-extrinsic notions of context. [Editor’s note: See also Beach’s discussion of the “Leper” segment, this issue.]

Moerman reports the case of an interaction in Thailand which took place in the presence of a district officer. A reference to a person as a leper is overlapped with a more “benign” reference: “He is sort of sick”. I present only Moerman’s translation:

Moerman, 1988, p. 126

```
39  B:  You talking about the singer
40  S:  That’s right.
41         (0.2)
42  S:  That Ba Naaw.
→ 43  WS:  Ba Naaw the leper.
→ 44  S:  He is sort of sick, that guy.
```
Moerman argues that the overlap at the end of this segment is "obliterative" or designed to keep the district official from hearing the word "leper." Moerman offers the following "ethnographic background," or "statement of the local knowledge that this situated occurrence calls to mind or makes relevant" (p. 21) as a way of explaining the overlap:

S is a client of the missionary under whose protection, and in whose compound, Naaw [the "Leper"] lives. S sometimes visits Naaw, relying upon missionary nurse assurances that Naaw has a harmless skin ailment and not leprosy. Were the district officer, to whom S knows that townsmen have complained about Naaw, to regard him as truly a leper, he would have him removed to a leper colony. In the presence of the district officer — the highest official a villager can hope or fear to meet — the otherwise harmless identification sequence tumbled S, and no other villager, into a sensitive matter (pp. 21-22).

In this instance, CCCA proceeds by locating a feature of talk (speech overlap) using conversation analytic apparatus, and then deploying ethnography to fill out the talk-extrinsic details to explicate the event from the participants' world view. These extrinsic ethnographic details include networks of relationships, personal histories, and facts about status hierarchies.

This CCCA explanation differs in two major respects from conversation analysis. First, we do not know how the ethnographer came upon this information. Second, we are not shown how talk-extrinsic data such as these are relevant to these persons at the particular moment of social interaction depicted here. While Moerman's explanation is absolutely plausible, there may be other ethnographic facts which could provide an equally plausible account for the meaning of the overlap.

A Conversation Analytic Account of the "Leper" Overlap

The contrast between Moerman's account of the fragment and a conversation analytic one is that the latter remains focused in the empirical, talk-intrinsic details of the fragment. A talk-intrinsic version of context can also furnish insights into the meaning of the event.
(I do not have the tape, and do not know Thai. The intention is only to illustrate contrasts in approaches to data.)

Notice the placement of the overlap at precisely the point where WS could be projected to be going to say "'leper.'" Given the format of the reference-so-far, from "'the I'" S is apparently able to project that the term "'leper'" will follow. That S expects, and may expect others, to hear the word "'leper'" is suggested by the fact that his turn characterizes the individual as ill, but in a more benign fashion than calling him a "'leper'" ("He is sort of sick"). This expectation is also demonstrated by the fact that the turn, especially in its early beginning and its offering of a synonym for the other’s characterization, is formatted as an agreement. The format of the turn, with the emphasis on "'is'" also suggests agreement. That agreement is relevant suggests an expectation that co-participants may have heard the previous reference. However, the content of "'He is sort of sick'" downgrades Naaw’s illness from leprosy to sort of sick. Pomerantz (1984) has noted that downgraded second assessments provide a method for disagreeing. In other words, S packages a disagreement in the turn-shape of an agreement. Further, by beginning his turn in overlap, the second assessment "'sort of sick'" is made available as an alternative to "'leper.'" In this way S disguises his disagreement both by packaging it within a turn-format for agreeing, and by providing it as a simultaneous alternative.

To summarize: This account uses talk-intrinsic evidence to suggest why S’s overlap is placed where it is. Its placement in overlap provides for it to perform a shift from "'leper'" to a more benign characterization without engaging in overt disagreement. This conversation analytic account confirms and elaborates the details in Moerman’s description, while confining its main work to explicating details in the talk. This account, for instance, shows just how S accomplishes the "'pinpoint'" timing of his overlap, and the features of conversation thereby invoked. The analysis suggests that conversation analysis is not limited to delimiting barren structure. Rather, local talk-intrinsic data such as those briefly described here may offer the researcher access to the significance of events for their participants.

Context for Moerman in this instance is extrinsic to interaction. Unlike conversation analysis, CCCA does not appear to require that
the explanation for the action be available to interaction’s participants or to readers. It is accessible to the researcher who knows the right questions to ask, but may not be demonstrably linked to the actual talk.

Context for a conversation analytic account of this fragment must be displayed in the local details of the talk, such as the precise placement of the overlap. These details may be amplified by comparison to what conversation analytic studies show about the resources to which speakers have access. But context itself remains constituted in the local details of the ongoing talk. My account proposes that participants could make use of what they know about assessments in understanding the downgraded characterization of Naaw. I made the additional (and unfounded) assumption that downgraded assessments may work as disagreements in Thai as they do in English.

These local details of the interaction provided a talk-intrinsic context through which speakers understood the ongoing action. Other threads of context are available in the conversation analytic tapestry. In order to elucidate them I examine the talk-intrinsic versions of context tacitly proposed by Pomerantz (1978) and by Drew (1987).

POMERANTZ ON RESPONSES TO COMPLIMENTS

In describing responses to compliments Pomerantz (1978) contrasts conversation analysis with a talk-extrinsic explanation by advice columnist “Dear Abby.” The question is why people frequently do not accept compliments. This is illustrated in the following instance:

Pomerantz, 1978, p. 94

[The referent is a performance for which B is responsible]

A: Oh it was just beautiful.

B: Well thank you uh I though it was quite nice.
In response to A’s compliment, B acknowledges its supportive sentiment ("thank you") but downgrades the appraisal from "beautiful" to "nice." Consequently, B only partially accepts the compliment. Dear Abby explains an event of this sort from a discourse-extrinsic perspective: That a lack of self-confidence leads to an inability to accept compliments. This answer to the question of why people resist compliments is recognizable to us — it resembles our common sense, taken-for-granted, mundane reasoning.

Pomerantz examines interaction to find talk-intrinsic answers to the problem. She argues that responding to compliments presents a dilemma because a compliment is both a supportive action and an assessment. To both accept the supportive action and agree with the assessment may pose problems for a compliment recipient.

Pomerantz shows that a recipient of a supportive action may respond with an acceptance or a rejection. (An example of an acceptance would be to say "thank you.") Alternatively a recipient may take the compliment as an assessment, making relevant an agreement of disagreement with the assessment (an agreement may take the form of an assessment similar in kind to the one which offered the compliment). Sacks (1973/1987) and Pomerantz (1984) document a "preference for agreement" with assessments. They show that participants orient to providing agreeing responses, and to avoid disagreeing responses. The recipient of an assessment, then, would experience some pressure to agree with the assessment.

In the case of compliments, though, this preference for agreement conflicts with another conversational preference, a proscription of self-praise. Pomerantz shows that a recipient who agrees with a compliment may be taken to have praised herself or himself. Reasoning from fragments of interaction, Pomerantz demonstrates cultural norms against self-praise: When people praise themselves, they or their interlocutors show through their talk that they take the self-praise to be worthy of censure. Pomerantz also cites instances in which self-praisers produce disclaimers or qualifications along with self-praise. These fragments show an interactive phenomenon of self-praise avoidance. Pomerantz therefore infers that in their talk, participants in our culture avoid self-praise.
To summarize Pomerantz' explanation of the compliment-recipient's dilemma: The norm against self-praise (and therefore favoring *disagreement* with a compliment) is in conflict with the preference for providing an agreeing response to the supportive action and assessment (favoring *agreement* with the compliment). Recipients respond to this dilemma by minimizing compliments — accepting the support but downgrading the assessments. In this way Pomerantz demonstrates a talk-intrinsic motivation for failures to accept compliments.

Dear Abby, like CCCA, constructs talk-extrinsic explanations of talk. But Pomerantz locates in talk two sets of cultural regularities — the preference for agreement and the preference for self-praise avoidance. Pomerantz demonstrates their operation in interaction independent of the current situation, and then applies these findings to the problem of compliment responses. This shows competing preferences as a problem for which downgraded compliment responses provide a solution.

Pomerantz thereby produces a finding about a culture from examination of conversations. Without stating it in this way, Pomerantz makes an ethnographic statement about cultural orientations to self-praise. Her method contrasts with ethnographic practices for asking natives for their views on self-praise. Rather than providing a version of what natives report themselves to think about their understanding of what the anthropologist appears to be asking them, Pomerantz examines many conversations to come upon talk-intrinsic phenomena. She relies on her own understanding of what participants take themselves to be doing, corroborated by what they show themselves in their talk to be doing.

For Pomerantz local details furnish the context for a specific conversational action. She has recourse to other conversations to elucidate aspects of context invoked by a compliment. The preference for agreement, and the preference for avoiding self-praise are not specific to compliments, but are demonstrably relevant in that environment. Thus findings from other domains of talk allow contexted explanation without recourse to talk-extrinsic phenomena. (While the term "preference for self-praise-avoidance" may have a psychological ring to it, Pomerantz presents a strictly interactional phenomenon.)
This approach assumes that our access to phenomena in the world is limited to its demonstrable availability in and through interaction.

DREW ON TEASES

Drew’s (1987) account of teases develops other strands of talk-intrinsic context. By explicating how actions carried out immediately before a tease bear on the tease, Drew uses the local context to explain why tease-recipients often respond seriously to teases. Drew characterizes serious responses to obvious teases as “po-faced.” He explains these responses on the basis of a local sense of context. He formulates the problem as follows:

The puzzle is, how is it that despite teases being very apparently not sincere proposals, and recognized as such, nevertheless recipients treat them as requiring a serious response? (1987, p. 232)

To answer this question Drew describes each tease’s relationship to the utterances just before and after it. Drew shows how these details provide the context out of which the tease is produced. This notion of context is strictly local as well as discourse-intrinsic. Drew explicated characteristics of prior and subsequent turns to resolve the puzzle of why tease-recipients give po-faced, or serious, responses.

Drew observes that teases are typically “next-positioned,” which is to say that they respond to something immediately prior. Specifically, they respond to something “elaborated” or “overdone” (pp. 236-7) in the prior turn. That is, the subsequent tease-recipient overdoses a complaint, or brags, or “goes on” about something. The teaser responds, in next turn:

Drew, 1987, pp. 236-237

Bill: I’m still gettin’g you know, hh ‘hh stomach pains I spewed last ni:ght, ... chronic diarrhea as we-ell,
just before I went to bed and... this morning
(well) I’ve had this bad stomach. So I guess the
same’s gonna happen tonight... I’ve been getting
funny things in front of my eyes actually. hh A
bit, just slightly, light flashes. But uh,
(0.3) tsk (still.)

→ Arthur: Well you probably got a least a week.

Drew notes the elaborateness with which Bill details his symptoms. The teasing response plays off of this elaborated, overdone character, and as it were “puts the complainable matter BACK IN PROPORTION” (p. 237). Here, then, a well-known property of conversation, that subsequent turns are intrinsically related to their priors (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), is applied to this specific action.

Second, Drew notices that the speaker of the elaborated prior turn is almost always the tease-recipient. Despite the fact that the roles of “speaker” and “other” as isolated facts about interactants do not always tell us much (Moerman, 1988, p. 14), when they are the relevant characterizations that recipients use, they may be informative. Drew shows how teases attribute deviant categories or actions to tease-recipients, while at the same time showing that the teases are not sincere but rather “gross, extreme, or outrageous” (p. 243). Teasers thereby display joking skepticism about the prior speaker’s overdone talk. For instance in the fragment above, Arthur teasingly proposes that Bill’s illness is serious enough to die from.

Drew explains that teases, while clearly outrageous, remain “close to the bone” in attributing an abnormal or deviant identity to the tease recipient which does minimally apply to them:

Insofar as recipients recognize that the normal identity/activity applies to themselves (usually they’ve laid claim to it in their prior turns), then they recognize that such is the basis for the deviance ascription conceivably applying also (p. 247).
In that Bill has claimed to have been feeling quite ill he minimally falls within the required identity of one fearing death. Thus, Arthur’s tease is “close enough to reality” to “provide recipients with the motivation to set the record straight in their serious, po-faced responses” (p. 247).

Drew, 1987, p. 224

Arthur: Well you probably got at least a week.
(0.4)

→ Bill: What of this:

Bill, who has evidence that Arthur is teasing him about impending death, nevertheless chooses to respond to a narrowly literal rendering of Arthur’s teasing turn — that he might remain sick for another week. Bill’s is a po-faced response to a tease, which Drew explains, along with the performance of the tease itself, in terms of contexted description: How individual speaking turns each show relevance to the turn before.

Drew’s claim is that one need not consider the prior relationship between teaser and tease recipient to explain their conduct. (That relationship may be consequential, of course; but the problem is specifying ways in which it is consequential). Rather, Drew explicates the local context — characteristics of the immediately preceding activities of each party, and the interrelations of these activities. He builds his account on similar descriptions of numerous cases. The local observable details of these cases support an account of the recurrent conversational practice of responding seriously to obvious teases.

At the same time, however, there remain undocumented cultural assumptions in Drew’s analysis. Certainly, speech communities have standards and practices for determining when a speaker is overbuilding a turn, or going on and on. These issues suggest an additional strand of context available to conversation analytic work, one that provides possible congruence with CCCA.

Where Pomerantz provides evidence for the cultural norm to which she appeals, Drew more informally calls on what we “know”
to be the case. For instance, Drew writes about Bill’s lengthy lament that led to his being teased: “‘The elaborateness with which Bill details his symptoms in this extract amounts almost to self-pity’” (237). Drew does not explain this ethnographic observation. It is not uncommon in conversation analyses for researchers to rely on what participants “know to be the case.” While in the case of self-praise-avoidance what we know to be the case was documented by multiple instances, here Drew (Goffmanesquely) relies on what anyone can be expected to know about normal practices. Like many of Goffman’s claims, this explanation of the context of this utterance is intuitively plausible and eminently researchable.

Pomerantz’ and Moerman’s work suggest that it would be possible to study a cultural norm from an ethnographic or a conversation analytic perspective. Each produces results which are quite differently assessable.

CONCLUSIONS

In the case of the “Leper” Moerman offers a possible explanation for a phenomenon of speech overlap. He uses the instance to claim that details of relationships, history, and norms may help us to explain why some feature of talk is produced in a given way. This may be contrasted with Drew’s and Pomerantz’ arguments, for they provide context-sensitive — i.e., local — details of the conversations in question, in the service of providing a context-free description of a phenomenon that could potentially occur in just this way in any given setting or culture.

Moerman suggests that talk anchors our findings about cultures: Given some occurrence in talk, what do we need to know about the culture in order to understand it? He uses conversation analytic findings and transcripts to pin down cultural butterflies. In contrast conversation analysts ask about the social actions conducted in and through talk. Context for conversation analysts is built in and through talk. [Section Editor’s note: This is not to suggest that all of context is
always specified in the talk. Rather, conversation analysts accept a methodic restriction to connect their analyses of context to details in talk and interaction. Speaker listeners also face this restriction.]

In class lectures Schegloff (1983) has proposed a distinction between practices of conversation — the mechanical features of talk upon which social action is hung, and practices in conversation — the activities we carry out in and through these mechanical features (c.f. Mandelbaum, 1990). Moerman seems to propose that conversation analysis takes these to be separable, and is interested only in practices of conversation. He suggests that such a focus misses the heart and soul of social interaction.

Indeed, certain analysts assign primacy to describing practices of conversation, arguing that, much as natural scientists must first attempt to delineate the building blocks of any object of study, we need to specify the components of talk. However, analysts do not argue that we may discover those basic units without examining what those units are used to build — the practices in conversation. Indeed, practices of and practices in conversation seem most aptly thought of as two sides of the same coin. [Section Editor’s note: See Streeck, this issue, on the dangers of dichotomy.]

Conversation analysts have specified some patterns of talk: The system whereby speakers alternate turns at talk with minimal and swiftly-resolved gaps and overlaps (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974); the methods for concatenating turns into sequences through which speakers carry out actions (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Sacks, 1987), and the procedures for repairing problems in talk (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). However, we undersell conversation analysis if we suggest that it aims merely to enumerate the bones of talk’s skeleton. Indeed, both Pomerantz and Drew suggest that it is hard to conceive of practices of conversation as “dry bones” which could stand alone.

Rather, conversation analysts most often seek to describe both structure (practices of conversation) and interaction (practices in conversation). The fundamental question for conversation analysts, as for everyday conversation participants, is “Why that now?” — why is that person saying just that at this particular point. Of necessity, then,
conversation analysts seek deeply contextualized accounts of how participants do things with words and other actions. Asking "Why that now?" has provided descriptions of: How people deal with ambiguity, and how it may arise (Schegloff, 1984; Hopper, 1989); what may be accomplished with a head shake (Goodwin, 1980; Schegloff, 1987); how people respond to compliments (Pomerantz, 1978); how people tell their troubles to one another (Jefferson, 1980); why people respond seriously to purportedly "humorous" teases (Drew, 1987); how people offer and refuse invitations (Drew, 1984; Davidson, 1984). In all these studies, analysts use talk-intrinsic details to explain context, instantiate it, and call it into question.

A system for conversation that is both context-sensitive and context-free is essentially and intrinsically tied to humans' cultures and their enterprises. Conversation analysts agree with Moerman that analysis must be "culturally contexted," but they differ from Moerman in focusing the work within talk-intrinsic threads of context.

My account suggests various strands of talk-intrinsic approaches to context. Schegloff (1987) proposes that speakers' knowledge of speech exchange systems is context for interaction. Pomerantz shows how interactants orient to preference systems, using examples from interaction to support claims about such cultural norms. Drew accounts for teases and responses within a local, turn-by-turn sense of context.

When investigators move away from interactions, to rely on "covert native knowledge" (Moerman, 1988, p. 4), they may have difficulty tying consequent explanation back to interactions. Certainly ethnography can enrich conversation analytic accounts. My account of the "Leper" overlap may be enriched by Moerman's explication of authority relations among the participants if we can specify connections between these authority relationships and how actions unfold. Conversation analysts' challenge to ethnography is to make findings talk-intrinsic: To specify how apparently talk-extrinsic factors operate upon social action. Conversation analysis has shown itself to be fundamentally concerned with, and capable of explicating, people and their moments. Its practitioners answer contextual "why?" questions in various talk-intrinsic ways, while extending our understanding of
how we accomplish talk in social action. Conversation analysts' work is inherently contextual in its expansion of our sense of "context" into, and beyond, mundane reason.

REFERENCES


